An In-Depth Analytical Breakdown of the Houston Texans' Protection Woes
The 2024 NFL season saw C.J. Stroud pressured more than any other quarterback, facing a league-high number of pressures and one of the highest pressure rates in the NFL. Naturally, this has led to questions:
Was Stroud to blame for these pressures by holding the ball too long?
Did defenses figure him out in Year 2, or was it a coaching issue?
How much blame falls on Houston’s offensive line and pass protection scheme?
By breaking down offensive line performance, blitz effectiveness, wide receiver seperation and scheme issues, this article will prove that Stroud was not responsible for his league-high pressure rate—instead, the Texans' pass protection scheme and offensive line struggled against advanced defensive strategies.
📌 Important: All statistics presented in this analysis include both the regular season and postseason for accuracy.
📌 Note: While PFF grades are not the definitive measure of player performance, they often provide a strong indicator of success or struggles. More importantly, PFF’s charting data—such as pressures allowed, time to throw, contested catch rates, and offensive line responsibility—is highly valuable for tracking trends and evaluating situational context. This analysis will use PFF’s data as a tool to assess C.J. Stroud’s 2024 season and Houston’s pass protection issues, while also considering offensive scheme, play design, and in-game circumstances.
📌 Note: PFF tracks two different "pressured dropback" numbers.
Pressured Dropbacks (274 for Stroud) include all pressures, whether caused by the offensive line, scheme, or Stroud himself.
Allowed Pressure Dropbacks (231 for Stroud) only include plays where the OL or blockers were responsible for allowing pressure.
When evaluating Stroud’s exposure to pressure, we use 274 pressured dropbacks. When assigning blame to the offensive line, we use 231 allowed pressure dropbacks
C.J. Stroud: The Most Pressured QB in 2024
Using PFF's Passing Pressure data, here’s how Stroud compared to other highly pressured quarterbacks in 2024 (including playoffs):
Quarterback | Total Dropbacks | Pressured Dropbacks | Pressure Rate (%) |
C.J. Stroud | 703 | 274 | 39.0% |
Sam Darnold | 672 | 263 | 39.1% |
Jalen Hurts | 556 | 223 | 40.1% |
Caleb Williams | 682 | 241 | 35.3% |
Patrick Mahomes | 770 | 254 | 33.0% |
Joe Burrow | 725 | 248 | 34.2% |
Lamar Jackson | 597 | 232 | 38.9% |
Josh Allen | 634 | 211 | 33.3% |
Key Takeaways
Stroud faced more total pressures than any other QB (274).
His 39.0% pressure rate was among the highest in the league, but it was not the highest—Jalen Hurts (40.1%) and Sam Darnold (39.1%) ranked higher.
Mahomes had 770 dropbacks but a much lower pressure rate (33.0%), suggesting better pass protection or quicker reads.
Was Stroud Responsible for His Own Pressures?
A common narrative is that quarterbacks who take frequent hits hold onto the ball too long or fail to recognize the blitz. However, PFF’s Allowed Pressures data reveals that Stroud improved significantly in 2024 compared to 2023 in terms of limiting his own pressures.
C.J. Stroud Allowed Pressures (2023 vs. 2024)
Year | QB-Attributable Pressure % | OL-Attributable Pressure % | APDB (Allowed Pressure Dropbacks) | QB-Attributable Sacks |
2023 | 15.6% | 79.9% | 179 | 11 |
2024 | 12.1% | 84.8% | 231 | 12 |
Stroud reduced his own pressure responsibility from 15.6% in 2023 to 12.1% in 2024.
The Texans’ offensive line was responsible for an even greater percentage of his pressures in 2024 (84.8%).
Stroud was only responsible for 12 sacks all season—significantly lower than many QBs in similar offensive systems.
Despite facing 52 more pressures in 2024 (231 vs. 179 in 2023), Stroud was responsible for only one more sack, proving he improved at avoiding self-inflicted sacks while the Texans’ pass protection as a whole got worse.
League-Wide Context: Where Did Stroud Rank in QB-Attributable Pressure & Sack Rate?
Among 31 quarterbacks with at least 80 pressured dropbacks, Stroud ranked 23rd (12.1%)—meaning 22 quarterbacks were responsible for a higher percentage of their own pressures.
Top 10 QB-Attributable Pressure % and Sacks Responsible For
Rank | Player | Team | APDB | QB-Attributable Pressure % | Sacks Responsible For |
1 | Bo Nix | DEN | 165 | 24.2% | 14 |
2 | Patrick Mahomes | KC | 216 | 23.1% | 16 |
3 | Russell Wilson | PIT | 143 | 22.4% | 9 |
4 | Josh Allen | BUF | 176 | 21.0% | 9 |
5 | Brock Purdy | SF | 156 | 19.9% | 15 |
6 | Jalen Hurts | PHI | 192 | 19.8% | 15 |
7 | Lamar Jackson | BLT | 192 | 18.8% | 10 |
8 | Caleb Williams | CHI | 203 | 18.7% | 17 |
9 | Gardner Minshew | LV | 102 | 18.6% | 7 |
10 | Daniel Jones | MIN | 128 | 17.2% | 7 |
Notable QBs who had a higher QB-attributable pressure rate than C.J. Stroud (12.1%): Patrick Mahomes (23.1%), Josh Allen (21.0%), Brock Purdy (19.9%), Jalen Hurts (19.8%), Lamar Jackson (18.8%).
Similar Pass Protection Schemes:
Shanahan Tree (Bobby Slowik, Kyle Shanahan, Mike McDaniel)
Brock Purdy (5th, 19.9%) ran a near-identical pass protection scheme under Kyle Shanahan, yet had a significantly worse self-inflicted pressure rate than Stroud. Purdy also took 12 QB-attributable sacks, the same as Stroud.
Tua Tagovailoa (26th, 8.6%) plays under Mike McDaniel, another Shanahan disciple, but his pressure rate is lowered because McDaniel adjusted the scheme for quick passing. Tua only had 7 QB-attributable sacks, showing how scheme adjustments helped him avoid pressure.
McVay Tree (LaFleur, O'Connell, McVay, Robinson)
Jordan Love (22nd, 12.3%) under Matt LaFleur’s McVay-style Packers offense
Sam Darnold (25th, 10.8%) in Kevin O'Connell’s McVay-style Vikings offense
Matthew Stafford (30th, 5.8%) in Sean McVay’s Rams offense
Kirk Cousins (31st, 4.7%) in Zac Robinson’s McVay-style Falcons offense
Texans Offensive Line: Who Was Responsible?
PFF tracks which offensive line positions were responsible for pressures allowed. Below is the Texans' breakdown by position in 2024, compared to the league average:
Texans OL Responsibility vs. League Averages
Position | Texans % of Pressures Allowed | League Average % |
Quarterback (QB) | 12.1% | 15.0% |
Left Tackle (LT) | 12.1% | 22.0% |
Left Guard (LG) | 22.5% | 18.0% |
Center (C) | 12.1% | 13.0% |
Right Guard (RG) | 19.5% | 18.0% |
Right Tackle (RT) | 22.1% | 21.0% |
Tight End (TE) | 6.9% | 2.4% |
Other (RB, extra blockers, etc.) | 5.6% | 6.5% |
OL as a Whole | 84.8% | 80.0% |
Key Takeaways from the OL Responsibility Data:
Stroud was responsible for fewer self-inflicted pressures (12.1%) than the league average (15.0%).
Houston’s LT allowed significantly fewer pressures than the league average (12.1% vs. 22.0%).
Left guard (22.5%) was the biggest issue in pass protection, allowing more pressure than any other position.
Right tackle and right guard combined for over 40% of total pressures, reinforcing that interior and right-side protection were major weaknesses.
Tight ends were responsible for nearly triple the league average in pressures allowed (6.9% vs. 2.4%).
The Texans’ OL as a whole allowed 84.8% of Stroud’s pressures—above the league average of 80.0%.
Context on Offensive Tackle Responsibility
Why Tackles Typically Have Higher Pressure Rates:
Elite Pass Rushers: Tackles face premier edge rushers (e.g., Myles Garrett, T.J. Watt, Micah Parsons, Nick Bosa), who specialize in pressuring the QB.
More One-on-One Blocking: Tackles are often left on an island in pass sets, unlike interior linemen who receive more help.
Longer Rush Path: Edge pressure takes longer to develop compared to interior pressure, which is usually faster but more contained.
How Did the Texans’ Tackles Compare? Despite tackles typically allowing more pressure than interior linemen, Houston’s left tackle actually allowed significantly fewer pressures (12.1%) than the league average for LTs (22.0%). This suggests that the bigger issues were on the right side of the line and with interior pass protection.
Additionally, the Texans' tight ends allowed nearly three times the league-average pressure rate, further exposing weaknesses in their blocking schemes. This supports the notion that Bobby Slowik’s protection plan struggled against defensive adjustments, particularly when facing simulated pressures, blitzes, and disguised coverages.
C.J. Stroud's Time to Throw: A Product of Poor Pass Protection?
One common argument against Stroud is that he took too long to get rid of the football, which could have contributed to the Texans' pass protection issues. However, a closer look at his Average Time to Throw (2.80 seconds) suggests that his extended time in the pocket was likely a result of poor pass protection rather than indecisiveness.
Key Observations on C.J. Stroud's Time to Throw:
Stroud's Average Time to Throw (2.80s) Ranked 4th Longest Among QBs
Only Lamar Jackson (2.98s), Jalen Hurts (2.96s), and Sam Darnold (2.92s) had longer times to throw.
This suggests he had to extend plays, whether due to pressure, a collapsing pocket, or receivers not getting open quickly.
How This Correlates with Pass Protection Issues:
As shown in the "Allowed Pressures" data, Stroud was the most pressured QB in the NFL (231 dropbacks under pressure).
Given that 84.8% of his pressures were attributed to the offensive line, it makes sense that his time in the pocket was longer than average because he had to maneuver away from defenders rather than operate from a clean pocket.
This does not mean Stroud was holding onto the ball indecisively—rather, it’s likely bad pass protection forcing him to extend plays beyond their intended timing.
How Stroud Compares to Other QBs in Time to Throw
Below is a breakdown of the top 10 QBs with the longest time to throw in 2024:
Rank | Player | Team | Dropbacks | Avg. Time to Throw (ATT) |
1 | Lamar Jackson | BAL | 591 | 2.98 |
2 | Jalen Hurts | PHI | 555 | 2.96 |
3 | Sam Darnold | MIN | 671 | 2.92 |
4 | C.J. Stroud | HST | 702 | 2.80 |
5 | Brock Purdy | SF | 532 | 2.75 |
6 | Justin Herbert | LAC | 615 | 2.75 |
7 | Bo Nix | DEN | 673 | 2.74 |
8 | Caleb Williams | CHI | 678 | 2.74 |
9 | Jordan Love | GB | 492 | 2.69 |
10 | Geno Smith | SEA | 650 | 2.68 |
Notable McVay & Shanahan Scheme QBs in the Top 10
One of the most relevant comparisons for C.J. Stroud’s time to throw comes from other quarterbacks in the Shanahan and McVay coaching trees, a scheme he was in last year and a scheme he will be in next year.
Shanahan Coaching Tree
Brock Purdy (2.75s) - San Francisco 49ers (Kyle Shanahan)
Purdy played in a nearly identical pass protection scheme to Stroud, which relies on the offensive line making calls instead of the QB setting protections.
Despite playing in a system designed to simplify reads for the QB, Purdy still struggled against pressure and had a similar time to throw.
This suggests that the pass protection structure may inherently lead to QBs having to extend plays rather than Stroud being at fault.
Tua Tagovailoa (2.31s) - Miami Dolphins (Mike McDaniel)
Tua played in the same Shanahan-style offense, but Mike McDaniel made a major adjustment, prioritizing quick passes, screens, and fast-developing routes.
This led to Tua having the fastest time to throw in the NFL (2.31s), showing that when a coach adjusts to protect the QB, the scheme can work to reduce pressure.
The contrast between Purdy (2.75s), Stroud (2.80s), and Tua (2.31s) highlights how the offensive play design matters in dictating how long a QB holds onto the ball.
McVay Coaching Tree
The McVay-style offenses have had mixed results when it comes to time to throw, but the best outcomes should be encouraging for Stroud under Nick Caley.
Jordan Love (2.69s) - Green Bay Packers (Matt LaFleur - McVay Coaching Tree)
Love also had a longer time to throw, showing that LaFleur’s variation of the McVay scheme isn’t necessarily a quick-pass system.
This makes sense, as Green Bay's offense leaned more on developing plays rather than rapid-fire throws.
Matthew Stafford (2.55s) - Los Angeles Rams (Sean McVay)
Much lower than Stroud and Love.
This is a promising sign for Stroud under Nick Caley, who spent his last two years with the Rams.
Kirk Cousins (2.36s) - Atlanta Falcons (Zac Robinson - McVay Coaching Tree)
Among the fastest in time to throw, which suggests a well-designed offense can lower this number.
Robinson replicated the McVay scheme, using an efficient, quick-pass style.
Sam Darnold (2.92s) - Minnesota Vikings (Kevin O’Connell - McVay Coaching Tree)
Higher than Stroud, showing O'Connell’s offense led to longer-developing plays.
This suggests that Stroud’s situation was more about scheme than personal hesitation.
Stroud’s Time to Throw on Sack Plays:
Stroud’s TTT on plays where he was sacked was 3.53s—not extreme, but it suggests he tried to extend plays rather than take an immediate sack.
This aligns with earlier data—he didn’t take sacks because of poor decision-making, but rather because protection broke down before a viable throw was available.
Stroud’s PFF Grades When Throwing in Under 2.5 Seconds vs. Holding the Ball Longer:
Time to Throw | PFF Offensive Grade | PFF Passing Grade |
< 2.5s | 79.3 | 77.6 |
> 2.5s | 76.8 | 73.2 |
Key Takeaway: Stroud was marginally better when he had quicker answers—his PFF passing grade was 4.4 points higher when getting the ball out faster.
This suggests that if the Texans improve their quick-game passing attack, Stroud could elevate his play even further.
Fair Criticisms of Stroud’s Sack Plays:
Could he have taken the sack sooner at times?
Possibly, but that’s easier said than done when the offense was frequently in 2nd-and-long or 3rd-and-long situations. In those moments, Stroud had to extend plays to give the offense a chance to move the chains rather than simply taking a loss.
Could he have thrown the ball away or scrambled for yards more often?
Yes, there were times when a quicker throwaway or taking off for a short gain could have been the better option. However, given the Texans’ struggles on early downs, he was often in situations where taking a checkdown or throwing it away wasn’t ideal—he needed to push for bigger plays.
The Bigger Picture:
While Stroud extending plays sometimes resulted in sacks, this wasn’t a case of reckless decision-making. It was a product of bad pass protection, a lack of quick-game solutions, and an offense that was frequently behind schedule.
Breaking Down Pressure vs. Blitz: What It Really Means for the Texans
When evaluating quarterback performance, it's important to understand the difference between pressure and blitz frequency—two terms that often get mixed up but measure completely different things. Just because a defense brings extra rushers doesn't mean they actually get home, and just because a quarterback faces pressure doesn't mean it came from a blitz.
Pressure affects how a quarterback performs under duress, while blitz rate tells us how often defenses are trying to speed up the QB's decision-making. PFF tracks these metrics separately, categorizing plays into whether a quarterback was under pressure or kept clean, and whether he was blitzed or not blitzed.
Under Pressure vs. Kept Clean: This measures whether the quarterback had a clean pocket or was affected by pass rush, regardless of how many rushers were sent. Pressure can come from a standard four-man rush or from an overloaded blitz.
Blitzed vs. Not Blitzed: This tells us how often a defense sends five or more rushers. But just because a quarterback was blitzed doesn’t mean he was pressured—if the offensive line and blockers pick it up, he still has a clean pocket.
Understanding these distinctions is key when analyzing the Texans’ pass protection and C.J. Stroud’s performance. Some quarterbacks thrive when blitzed but struggle under pressure, while others stay composed under pressure but falter when teams drop into coverage. Now, let’s break down how Stroud and the Texans’ offense have fared in each of these scenarios, starting with pressure.
C.J. Stroud’s Performance Under Pressure: A Mixed Bag, But Context Matters
Despite facing the most pressures of any QB in the NFL, C.J. Stroud held up better than some might expect. While certain stats paint him in a favorable light, others highlight room for improvement—but the key factor is context.
PFF Passing Grade Under Pressure: Better Than Some of the Best
📌 54.3 (12th out of 30 QBs with 100+ pressured dropbacks)
Higher than:
Jalen Hurts (30.2)
Matthew Stafford (33.3)
Kirk Cousins (48.1)
Comparable to:
Brock Purdy (56.5)
Jordan Love (53.4)
Lower than:
Lamar Jackson (71.2)
Patrick Mahomes (61.0)
Sam Darnold (60.7)
Josh Allen (59.4)
Turnover-Worthy Play Rate (TWP%) Under Pressure: Smart Decisions
📌 3.1% (7th lowest out of 30 QBs)
Lower (better) than:
Josh Allen – 5.5%
Jalen Hurts – 5.5%
Patrick Mahomes – 3.7%
Comparable to Caleb Williams (2.6%)
Big-Time Throw Rate (BTT%) Under Pressure: Still Taking Shots
📌 6.5% (11th out of 30 QBs)
Higher than:
Jalen Hurts (5.3%)
Patrick Mahomes (5.7%)
Jordan Love (2.4%)
Lower than:
Josh Allen (11.0%)
Sack-to-Pressure Ratio (P2S%): The Biggest Concern
📌 23.0% (7th highest out of 30 QBs)
Higher than (Worse):
Patrick Mahomes (18.5%)
Brock Purdy (14.0%)
Josh Allen (9.0%)
Comparable to:
Jalen Hurts (22.9%)
Lower than (Better):
Caleb Williams (27.8%)
Notes:
Josh Allen and Lamar Jackson have elite escapability—Stroud doesn’t play that way.
Mahomes benefits from a great pocket presence and structured offensive line.
Stroud’s high sack rate was more about his OL than his ability to escape, although it did appear at times he wasn't quite as effective as last year escaping the pocket. The sheer increase in volume can be a factor in that.
Comparing to 2023: A Noticeable Decline Under Pressure
Category | Under Pressure (2023) | Under Pressure (2024) |
Completion % | 51.8% | 46.8% |
YPA | 6.1 | 6.3 |
P2S% | 17.4% | 23.0% |
Passer Rating | 76.4 | 69.7 |
Takeaway: Stroud was better under pressure in 2023, suggesting that the Texans’ offensive line regressed in 2024, forcing him into tougher situations.
More free rushers, stunts, and exotic blitzes forced him to react faster.
The sheer number of pressures wore on him over time.
C.J. Stroud’s Performance Under Pressure vs. Kept Clean: A Clear Contrast (2024 vs. 2023)
Lets compare C.J. Stroud’s "Kept Clean vs. Under Pressure" data for both 2024 and 2023. The data highlights how much worse his offensive line performed in 2024, leading to a noticeable drop in efficiency under pressure and overall effectiveness.
Kept Clean vs. Under Pressure (2024 vs. 2023)
Category | Under Pressure (2024) | Kept Clean (2024) | Under Pressure (2023) | Kept Clean (2023) |
Dropback % (DB%) | 39.0% | 61.0% | 35.4% | 64.6% |
Attempts | 186 | 407 | 171 | 383 |
Completion % | 46.8% | 71.3% | 51.8% | 69.5% |
Yards per Attempt (YPA) | 6.3 | 7.6 | 6.1 | 9.2 |
TD-INT Ratio | 5 TD / 3 INT | 16 TD / 10 INT | 3 TD / 0 INT | 23 TD / 5 INT |
Pressure to Sack % (P2S%) | 23.0% | 0.0% | 17.4% | 0.0% |
Time to Throw (TTT) | 3.66s | 2.60s | 3.64s | 2.53s |
Passer Rating (NFL) | 69.7 | 95.8 | 76.4 | 112.9 |
Key Takeaways
1. Stroud’s Efficiency Dropped Under Pressure
46.8% completion under pressure vs. 71.3% when kept clean – a massive drop-off.
6.3 YPA under pressure vs. 7.6 YPA when clean shows that pressure forced checkdowns and hurried throws.
Passer rating dropped from 95.8 when clean to 69.7 under pressure.
Takeaway: Stroud was efficient when given time but was significantly hindered by pressure, which disrupted his ability to execute plays at a high level.
2. The Texans' Offensive Line Didn’t Hold Up
Stroud was pressured on 39.0% of his dropbacks, meaning he faced pressure on nearly 2 of every 5 passes.
His 23.0% P2S% under pressure was one of the highest in the league, meaning when he was pressured, he often had no escape and took a sack.
Takeaway: If the OL had provided better protection, Stroud’s efficiency and passing production could have been much higher. His sack rate increasing (P2S%) further proves that the offensive line failed to hold up, forcing him into impossible situations.
3. 2024 vs. 2023: A Noticeable Decline
Completion % under pressure declined (49% in 2023 → 46.8% in 2024).
P2S% increased, meaning Stroud was sacked more often when pressured in 2024 than in 2023.
Despite the added pressure, Stroud’s performance when kept clean remained strong.
Takeaway: Stroud was better under pressure in 2023, suggesting that the Texans’ offensive line regressed significantly in 2024, making life even harder for him. This could be due to the higher number of pressures and the types of pressures—many of which were free rushers off stunts, zone blitzes, and simulated pressures that limited his ability to make plays by how quickly they got to him.
4. "Kept Clean" in 2024 Wasn’t the Same as 2023
Stroud proved in 2023 that when kept clean, he was elite (9.2 YPA, 112.9 passer rating).
However, his kept clean numbers dipped in 2024—which can suggest that he was under more consistent pressure, even when he wasn’t officially "pressured" by PFF’s standards.
The cumulative effect of constant pressure may have sped up his internal clock, forcing him to rush decisions even when the pocket was clean.
Takeaway: Even when PFF deemed a play "kept clean," it’s fair to question whether Stroud actually felt clean in those moments. The relentless pressure he faced throughout the season likely made him play faster than he needed to at times.
How the Blitz Disrupted C.J. Stroud and the Texans’ Offense
Blitzing a young quarterback is often seen as a way to rattle them, but in C.J. Stroud’s case, his ability to handle pressure wasn’t the issue—it was the Texans’ offensive line and scheme that struggled to adjust. With the Blitzed vs. Not Blitzed data now available for both 2023 and 2024, we can break down exactly how Stroud was affected and why this wasn’t a QB problem, but rather a protection and coaching issue.
Blitzed vs. Not Blitzed: 2023 vs. 2024
Category | When Blitzed (2023) | Not Blitzed (2023) | When Blitzed (2024) | Not Blitzed (2024) |
Dropback % (DB%) | 30.1% | 69.9% | 31.4% | 68.6% |
Attempts | 186 | 432 | 185 | 482 |
Completion % | 64.8% | 63.7% | 62.2% | 64.2% |
Yards per Attempt (YPA) | 8.7 | 8.0 | 6.6 | 7.4 |
TD-INT Ratio | 10 TD / 2 INT | 16 TD / 3 INT | 7 TD / 5 INT | 14 TD / 8 INT |
Pressure to Sack % (P2S%) | 24.7% | 13.7% | 26.4% | 20.8% |
Time to Throw (TTT) | 2.64s | 3.05s | 2.74s | 3.14s |
Passer Rating (NFL) | 107.8 | 99.1 | 82.8 | 89.8 |
1. The Texans Faced Slightly More Blitzes, But the Type of Blitzes Were the Bigger Issue
At first glance, Stroud’s 31.4% blitz rate in 2024 isn’t drastically different from 30.1% in 2023. However, the key difference wasn’t just the frequency of blitzes but the types of pressures defenses used against Houston:
Zone Blitzes: Defenses often rushed linebackers or safeties while dropping defensive linemen into coverage, confusing Houston’s protection rules.
Defensive Back Blitzes: Nickel, safety, and corner blitzes frequently caught the Texans off guard after being invited into the box vs condensed formations, leading to free rushers.
Delayed Blitzes: Defenders faked coverage responsibilities before attacking late, leaving the Texans’ offensive line slow to react.
Simulated Pressures: Houston’s offensive line was often tricked into expecting a blitz when none came, causing confusion in their blocking assignments.
2. The Texans’ Protection Scheme and Play Calling Left Stroud in Tough Situations
The lack of proper hot routes, check-downs, and pre-snap adjustments made it harder for Stroud to counter the blitz. While elite offenses use quick reads to punish aggressive defenses, the Texans:
Frequently left unblocked rushers due to protection breakdowns, whether from tight ends or miscommunications on the OL.
Didn’t adjust to defensive counters, as teams repeatedly exploited the same weaknesses without Houston making midseason corrections.
Condensed formations didn’t provide easy outlets by inviting defenders into the box to blitz & limiting Stroud’s quick-read options.
3. Stroud’s Performance Against the Blitz Declined in 2024
Compared to his elite efficiency against the blitz in 2023 (107.8 passer rating, 8.7 YPA), Stroud’s 2024 numbers showed a noticeable drop-off (82.8 passer rating, 6.6 YPA).
His YPA fell by over two full yards, showing he had fewer chances to push the ball downfield.
His passer rating dropped by 25 points, showing how defenses found ways to make the blitz more effective.
His P2S% increased from 24.7% to 26.4%, meaning when blitzed, he got sacked more often—likely due to unblocked rushers, not poor decision-making.
4. The Coaching and OL Were the Biggest Culprits
By season’s end, it was clear that Houston’s pass protection system was broken against the blitz. The Texans' own actions proved this when they:
Fired offensive coordinator Bobby Slowik.
Fired offensive line coach Chris Strausser.
Promoted assistant OL coach Cole Popovich, keeping the technique but changing the protection rules.
Hired Nick Caley from the Rams who handled these issues much better than the Texans (twice vs the Vikings last year).
How Stroud Compared to Other NFL QBs Against the Blitz
After breaking down Stroud’s 2024 blitz data, it’s important to compare it to the rest of the league. This helps determine whether his drop-off was a personal issue or if it was caused by the Texans’ offensive scheme and pass protection.
Blitzed Dropback Rate (DB%)
Stroud was blitzed on 31.4% of his dropbacks, ranking 19th out of 26 qualified QBs (minimum 100 pressured dropbacks). This suggests that while defenses respected his ability to read coverages, they still attempted to speed up his process with extra rushers.
Other notable QBs:
Patrick Mahomes: 26.4%
Lamar Jackson: 37.2%
Kirk Cousins: 32.6%
Josh Allen: 34.1%
Jordan Love: 36.4%
Brock Purdy: 35.8%
Jalen Hurts: 35.6%
Matthew Stafford: 34.1%
Sam Darnold: 26.9%
Yards Per Attempt (YPA) vs. the Blitz – How Stroud Stacked Up
One of the biggest indicators of a quarterback's ability to handle the blitz is Yards Per Attempt (YPA). A high YPA suggests the QB was able to generate explosive plays against extra rushers, while a low YPA indicates they were either forced into checkdowns or pressured into bad throws.
How Stroud Compared to Key QBs in YPA vs. the Blitz:
Sam Darnold (MIN) – 9.4 YPA
Brock Purdy (SF) – 9.2 YPA
Matthew Stafford (LA) – 8.3 YPA
Josh Allen (BUF) – 7.9 YPA
Kirk Cousins (ATL) – 7.5 YPA
Jalen Hurts (PHI) – 7.3 YPA
Jordan Love (GB) – 7.1 YPA
C.J. Stroud (HST) – 6.6 YPA
Takeaway
Stroud’s 6.6 YPA vs. the blitz ranked below several notable QBs, reinforcing the idea that when teams sent extra rushers, the Texans' pass protection didn’t consistently give him the time to capitalize. More importantly, quarterbacks in similar offensive schemes—like Brock Purdy, Matthew Stafford, and even Sam Darnold—were able to generate more explosive plays against the blitz. This suggests that while Stroud showed promise, the Texans may need to adjust their protection schemes, route concepts, or hot reads to help him take advantage of blitzes more effectively.
How Texans WR Play & Offensive Scheme Impacted C.J. Stroud's Performance
Data on the Texans’ wide receivers and offensive scheme suggests a major issue was a lack of consistent separation, structured opportunities, and plays breaking down too early, forcing Stroud into difficult situations.
Texans WRs vs. League Averages in Key Metrics
League-Wide Averages for WRs:
aDOT (Average Depth of Target): 11.34 yards
CTC% (Contested Catch Rate): 44.14%
Texans WRs Compared to League Averages:
Player | aDOT (Texans) | Comparison to NFL Avg (11.34) | CTC% (Texans) | Comparison to NFL Avg (44.14%) |
Nico Collins | 11.9 | Slightly Above Avg | 57.1% | Well Above Avg |
Stefon Diggs | 8.3 | Below Avg | 50.0% | Above Avg |
Tank Dell | 13.3 | Above Avg | 50.0% | Above Avg |
Diontae Johnson | 11.3 | Slightly Below Avg | 46.7% | Slightly Above Avg |
Dalton Schultz | 8.3 | Below Avg | 47.4% | Above Avg |
Robert Woods | 9.8 | Below Avg | 33.3% | Below Avg |
John Metchie III | 9.3 | Below Avg | 58.3% | Well Above Avg |
Key Takeaways from the Data
Texans WRs Had a Higher Contested Catch Rate Than the NFL Average
John Metchie III (58.3%), Nico Collins (57.1%), Stefon Diggs (50.0%), and Tank Dell (50.0%) all had contested catch rates well above the league average (44.14%).
This means Stroud was often throwing into tight windows, proving that his receivers were not consistently creating separation.
The offense was frequently dependent on Stroud making difficult throws rather than getting easy completions.
Texans' Pass Game Lacked Consistently Designed Open Looks
While Stroud was elite at making throws into tight windows, the Texans' scheme rarely created "free" opportunities for him to hit open receivers.
The high contested catch rates suggest that Houston’s offense didn’t consistently manufacture separation, meaning Stroud had to rely more on his accuracy and arm talent to complete passes.
Stroud’s aDOT May Have Been Affected by Pressure from Bad Pass Pro Scheme rather than Route Concepts
While Nico Collins' aDOT (11.9) is above average, it could have been even higher had Stroud been given time to throw downfield.
Stroud was pressured more than any other QB, meaning he often had to escape the pocket before deep routes fully developed.
Plays may have felt quick due to the pocket collapsing, rather than by design. Receivers often had to work back toward Stroud rather than continuing their original route concepts.
Plays Collapsing Early Could Have Increased Contested Catch Rate & Decreased Separation
If Stroud was frequently forced to flush the pocket early due to pressure, this could have negatively impacted WR separation.
When a QB extends plays, WRs often have to abandon their routes and work back to the ball, leading to more contested targets.
Many of Stroud's contested throws may have come not because receivers were failing to separate initially, but because the play broke down before they could finish their routes.
This would explain why the Texans' WRs had such high contested catch rates despite their solid individual talent.
Why Contested Catch Rate (CTC%) Matters for QB Pressure
A higher contested catch rate (CTC%) often correlates with less WR separation, but it’s not a 1:1 relationship. Here’s how they are connected:
More Contested Catches Suggest WRs Weren't Consistently Creating Separation
If a WR frequently makes contested catches, it means they are covered tightly when targeted.
Elite route runners (like Tyreek Hill, Justin Jefferson) create more separation, leading to fewer contested catch situations.
Physical possession WRs (like DeAndre Hopkins, George Pickens) rely more on winning in traffic, meaning they see more contested targets.
The New Offensive Scheme Can Help Stroud by Creating More Open Targets
With Nick Caley taking over as OC, expect more motion, route combinations, and designed mismatches to help WRs get open.
By improving WR route structures and protections, Stroud won’t have to rely solely on tight-window throws under pressure.
Why Nico Collins' aDOT Might Be Lower Due to Screen Usage & Pressure
Collins was the Texans' X receiver, typically the role with the highest aDOT on the team. However, at 11.9 yards, his aDOT wasn’t significantly higher than the league average. This suggests that Collins may have had more screen targets, which artificially lowered his aDOT, as well as routes that had to be shortened due to pressure.
Supporting Evidence
Screens naturally lower aDOT since they are caught behind or near the line of scrimmage.
Collins had 5.3 YAC/REC (yards after catch per reception)—a high number for an X receiver.
Tank Dell (13.3 aDOT) and Diontae Johnson (11.3 aDOT) were the true deep threats (Z) when factoring screens & broken plays.
Stroud being pressured frequently meant fewer true deep-ball opportunities, which could have suppressed Collins’ aDOT.
Final Reciever Takeaways
Yes, Collins’ aDOT being lower than expected is likely due to increased screen usage and protection issues.
Tank Dell and Diontae Johnson’s higher aDOTs make sense for Z receivers who had more vertical plays, but shouldn't be higher than a true deep threat like Nico Collins.
A better offensive line and structured passing attack should allow Stroud to target Collins deeper downfield in 2025.
Play-Action Usage and Effectiveness: How It Helped Stroud and Why It Could Be Even Better in 2025
One of the biggest factors in evaluating quarterback performance is how much their offense used play-action and how well they performed when utilizing it. Play-action is designed to freeze defenders, create better protection, and generate more time for the quarterback to make throws.
How Often Did the Texans Use Play-Action?
Before diving into performance, let’s compare how frequently similiar schemed teams used play-action vs. non-play-action plays.
Player | Team | Play-Action % | Non Play-Action % | Play Action Pass Grade | Non Play Action Pass Grade | BTT% (PA) | BTT% (Non-PA) | TWP% (PA) | TWP% (Non-PA) | Sack to Pressure % (PA) | Sack to Pressure % (Non-PA) |
C.J. Stroud | HOU | 26.5% | 73.5% | 80.8 | 72.9 | 4.8 | 4.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 14.8 | 25.4 |
Sam Darnold | MIN | 28.0% | 72.0% | 88.5 | 69.0 | 8.3 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 19.7 | 22.3 |
Matthew Stafford | LAR | 29.8% | 70.2% | 87.8 | 63.9 | 5.2 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 1.8 | 11.1 | 19.9 |
Brock Purdy | SF | 22.7% | 77.3% | 69.8 | 76.1 | 0.0 | 4.0 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 12.2 | 16.4 |
Jordan Love | GB | 24.4% | 75.6% | 69.4 | 73.8 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.95 | 11.7 |
Kirk Cousins | ATL | 13.6% | 86.4% | 68.1 | 71.8 | 4.4 | 2.4 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 19.7 |
Key Takeaways from the Play-Action Data
Stroud’s 80.8 play-action passing grade ranked above most McVay and Shanahan QBs, proving he was highly effective in those concepts.
Stroud was much better in play-action (80.8) than non-play-action (72.9), reinforcing that the Texans' scheme struggled in non-play-action situations.
Houston ran play-action on 26.5% of plays, which is less than most other McVay/Shanahan-influenced teams (Rams: 29.8%, Vikings: 28.0%, 49ers: 22.7%).
Brock Purdy was the only QB in the sample who performed worse in play-action than non-play-action, suggesting San Francisco’s offense may have struggled from injuries to the runningback room.
Play-action typically provides more time to throw, making it a valuable tool for QBs who struggle under immediate pressure. This further supports the argument that Stroud thrived when given time and struggled when the Texans’ protection broke down in non-play-action concepts.
Why Does Play-Action Help QBs?
Play-action has a well-documented effect on pass protection and defensive reactions:
Defenders hesitate due to the run fake, which can slow down the pass rush and create a cleaner pocket.
QBs typically get more time to throw, as offensive linemen sell the run before setting into pass protection.
It forces linebackers and safeties to react to the fake, potentially opening throwing lanes that wouldn’t exist in standard dropback concepts.
Since Stroud performed significantly better in play-action, this suggests that he was at his best when given extra time to throw, as opposed to quick-game passing concepts that relied more on immediate separation and fast reads.
Could Play-Action Be Even More Effective in 2025?
Yes—for two major reasons:
1. The Texans’ Run Game Wasn’t Effective in 2024
A stronger run game makes play-action more dangerous, as defenders are more likely to bite on fakes.
The Texans struggled in run-blocking efficiency, meaning defenses weren’t respecting the run as much.
With Nick Caley potentially implementing a more gap-heavy rushing attack in 2025, this could make play-action even more effective.
2. Play-Action Can Be Used More to Help Stroud
The Texans ranked middle-of-the-pack in play-action usage (26.5%), meaning there’s room to increase it.
Teams like the Rams and Vikings ran more play-action, helping their QBs create better throwing opportunities.
If Caley incorporates more play-action concepts, Stroud could lean into his strengths and benefit from better-designed opportunities to throw.
Final Takeaways
Stroud’s success in play-action proves he thrives when given time to throw—further evidence that his struggles in 2024 were more about protection and offensive scheme than his own limitations.
Houston’s play-action rate was lower than most other McVay/Shanahan-influenced teams, meaning there’s potential for more play-action usage in 2025.
A stronger run game in 2025 should make play-action even more effective, giving Stroud more opportunities to exploit defenses with extra time in the pocket.
Nick Caley’s background suggests he will adjust the offensive structure, potentially leaning more into play-action to maximize Stroud’s efficiency.
This data further supports the argument that Stroud wasn’t the problem in 2024—the Texans’ offensive structure and protection issues played a significant role in his pressure rates and performance.
Year | Play-Action % | Pass Grade | YPA | aDOT | BTT% | TWP% | P2S% | Sacks | INTs |
2023 | 27.3% | 79.6 | 11.2 | 11.1 | 7.1 | 4.2 | 23.2 | 13 | 2 |
2024 | 26.5% | 80.8 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 4.8 | 3.1 | 14.8 | 9 | 3 |
Key Observations: What Changed for Stroud in Play-Action?
Stroud was more aggressive in 2023, with a much higher YPA (11.2) and aDOT (11.1), indicating he took more deep shots off play-action.
His Big-Time Throw Rate (BTT%) was higher in 2023 (7.1%) compared to 2024 (4.8%), showing he took more chances downfield off play-action last year.
Stroud’s sack-to-pressure ratio (P2S%) in play-action improved significantly from 2023 (23.2%) to 2024 (14.8%), suggesting he did a better job avoiding sacks off play-action despite worse protection.
Turnover-Worthy Play % (TWP%) decreased from 4.2% in 2023 to 3.1% in 2024, showing that while he was more conservative, he was also safer with the football.
The decrease in aDOT and YPA in 2024 suggests he didn’t have the same confidence in his protection to take deep shots, opting for shorter, safer throws.
Why Did Stroud’s Play-Action Approach Change?
He was pressured more in 2024, causing him to speed up his process and avoid deep-developing plays.
The Texans’ offensive line was worse in pass protection, making it harder to hold onto the ball for longer PA shots.
This resulted in a shift to shorter, quicker throws in play-action, limiting his ability to take deep shots.
His sack avoidance improved, which means he adjusted to the increased pressure but had to sacrifice aggressiveness.
With a better offensive line and stronger run game under Nick Caley in 2025, Stroud could return to a more explosive play-action passer.
This data further reinforces that Houston’s offensive line struggles in 2024 forced Stroud to change his playstyle, limiting his aggressiveness off play-action.
Conclusion: Key Takeaways from the Texans' Protection Woes in 2024
Stroud wasn’t the problem—Houston’s OL and scheme were. He faced the most pressures (274) in the NFL, with 84.8% of them caused by the OL, mainly due to poor interior blocking and TE pass protection.
Blitz issues were a scheme failure, not a Stroud failure. His YPA vs. the blitz dropped from 8.7 (2023) to 6.6 (2024), and unblocked rushers were a recurring issue. Other Shanahan/McVay QBs (Purdy, Stafford) thrived due to better protection adjustments.
Wide receiver separation & quick-game concepts weren’t helping. Texans WRs had a higher contested catch rate than league average, meaning Stroud was throwing into tight windows far too often.
Play-action was a strength but underutilized. Stroud’s 80.8 play-action passing grade was elite, but Houston ran play-action less than other McVay/Shanahan teams.
Nick Caley’s offense should fix these issues in 2025. The Texans fired Bobby Slowik and Chris Strausser, recognizing their scheme’s flaws. Expect better protection calls, hot reads, and play-action usage under Caley.
Final Verdict:
Stroud didn’t regress—Houston’s protection and scheme did.
With improved protection, expect a major leap in 2025.
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